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I show that if an agent is risk neutral over a set of alternatives contained in a
Euclidean space, then her utility function decreases linearly in the city block distance
to her ideal point. Given a set of alternatives which is not contained in a Euclidean
space, I ﬁnd simple necessary and suﬃcient conditions on preferences such that, for any
p ≥ 1, there exists a mapping of the set of alternatives into a Euclidean space where
the utility of the agent is a decreasing function of the lp distance to her ideal point.
City block and quadratic Euclidean utilities are the special cases p =1and p =2 .
For these cases I extend the result to a society with multiple agents, ﬁnding additional
conditions such that a common space exists in which the preferences of every agent are
representable by city block utilities, or by quadratic Euclidean utilities.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D81, D72.
Keywords: Utility representation, spatial models, multidimensional preferences,
spatial representation, lp norms, city block preferences.
In decision theory, game theory or social choice, a multidimensional spatial model
is used to represent preferences and choices over objects that have multiple attributes or
dimensions and values within each attribute have a natural order so that objects can be
ordered according to their values in any given attribute. Political competition over multiple
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1policy issues is one application of spatial models. Each policy issue corresponds to a given
dimension on a multidimensional vector space. A standard assumption on preferences is
that each agent has an ideal policy bundle, represented by a most preferred point in a
multidimensional policy space, and that preferences over policy bundles are representable
by a utility function deﬁned over the vector space that is decreasing in the Euclidean distance
to the ideal policy bundle, either linearly, or in quadratic or exponential form. If preferences
are Euclidean or more generally smooth, for a generic distribution of ideal points the core
of simple majority is generically empty and there exists no stable policy outcome under
simple majority voting rule, as shown by Plott [19]. On the other hand, if preferences are
linearly decreasing in the l1 or city block distance to an ideal policy bundle instead of in
the Euclidean distance, then under general conditions, the majority rule core is not empty
and there exists a stable policy outcome, as shown by Rae and Taylor [21], Wendell and
Thorson [26], McKelvey and Wendell [15] and, more recently, Humphreys and Laver [8].
In this paper, I provide theoretical foundations for the assumption of city block prefer-
ences, and hence, indirectly, for the existence of core outcomes in multidimensional political
competition under majority voting.
Empirical work by Grynaviski and Corrigan [7] ﬁnds that a model based on the city
block or l1 metric outperforms a model based on the Euclidean or l2 metric in explaining
the choices of US voters. Using data from Norway, Westholm [27] obtained similar results
in favor of the city block metric over a model based on the square of the Euclidean distance.
A city block metric calculates the distance between two points in a multidimensional space
by calculating the absolute value of the diﬀerence of the two vectors on each dimension, and
then aggregating across all dimensions by simple addition or by a weighted sum. Research
on artiﬁcial intelligence and cognitive sciences such as the work of Shepard [23] and other
psychology papers reviewed by Arabie [1] argues that given objects with multiple attributes
such that agents perceive attributes to be separable, agents measure distance on these
separable attributes by aggregating the distance in each attribute. Therefore, if attributes
are separable, geometric models should use the city block or l1 metric rather than the
Euclidean or l2 metric.
I make a direct theoretical argument in favor of the city block metric, irrespective of
how agents cognitively perceive and measure distance. I provide an axiomatic foundation
for utility functions that depend on the city block metric, ﬁnding conditions on preferences
2over policy bundles such that the utility function that represents these preferences must be
a function of the city block metric. First I consider a set of alternatives that is a subset
of a Euclidean space. Then I take a step back toward more remote primitives, studying
preferences over a more abstract set of alternatives that is not a subset of a Euclidean space.
Given a set of alternatives that is a subset of a Euclidean space, I show that if the
preferences of an agent are representable by a utility function and the agent is risk neutral in
the given Euclidean space, then the utility function that represents the preferences is linearly
decreasing in the city block distance to the ideal policy bundle. Risk neutrality is a strong
and intuitively problematic assumption in an economic environment in which the dimensions
corresponds to diﬀerent goods that the agent can consume. Diminishing marginal utility
of consumption is then an argument to assume that the agent is risk averse. However, as
noted by Osborne [18], preferences over ideological issues are conceptually diﬀerent than
preferences over consumption of goods, and the evidence of risk aversion over consumption
is not relevant to the question of risk attitudes over ideological issues. For instance, it is
highly unclear that enjoying a second unit of civil liberties provides less extra utility than
enjoying a ﬁrst one. It depends not only on the attitude toward risk of the agent, but also on
the chosen representation of units of civil liberty in a space. Using data from the American
National Election Studies, Berinsky and Lewis [4] ﬁnd that US voters are risk neutral. They
reach this ﬁnding using data on the self-placement of the citizen on a seven-point ideology
scale, the location of the candidates as perceived by the voter, the uncertainty about this
perception, and the candidate preferred by the voter.
If agents are risk neutral given a set of alternatives deﬁned as a subset of a Euclidean
space, the utility function that represents the preferences of the agent is linearly decreasing
in the l1 distance to the ideal policy bundle of the agent. It follows that theoretical models
ought to discard the Euclidean distance and use the city block distance instead as the stan-
dard to construct speciﬁc utility functions in any application where the ﬁndings of Berinsky
and Lewis are robust and agents are risk neutral in the chosen spatial representation of
alternatives.
In many applications, there is no natural spatial representation of the policy alternatives.
Rather, the spatial representation is an abstract construction. Alternatives have multiple
attributes and each attribute is endowed with a natural order, but the exact location of
each alternative in a Euclidean space and the distance between alternatives is an object of
3choice for the theorist who arbitrarily chooses to endow the set of alternatives with a spatial
representation by mapping alternatives into a Euclidean space. For instance, Freedom House
classiﬁes countries according to the civil rights they allow, dividing them into seven tiers,
more freedom corresponding to a lower tier. While we may accept the partial order of
countries given by these tiers, the one-to-seven scale is arbitrary and it is diﬃcult to accept
that the distance in rights from tier one to tier two is equal to the distance from tier two
to tier three in any objective sense.
In the second part of the paper I consider abstract alternatives that have multiple
attributes. In the political economy application, an alternative is a policy bundle, and
each attribute corresponds to a given political issue. Although policies on a given issue
are endowed with a natural order, there is no exogenously given spatial representation of
policies. Instead, I take as a primitive a preference relation on the abstract set of policy
bundles and I assume that this preference is representable by a utility function. I seek
conditions on preferences such that there exists a mapping of the set of policy bundles
into a Euclidean space such that each dimension in this space corresponds to an issue, the
location of policies along each dimension in the space is monotonic in the exogenous order
of policies within each issue, and the preferences over points in the Euclidean space are
representable by a utility function that is linearly decreasing in the city block distance to
the ideal point of the agent.
I ﬁnd that the necessary and suﬃcient conditions on primitives for there to be a spatial
representation such that in this space, preferences can be represented by a utility function
that is decreasing in the p power of the lp distance to an ideal point are the same for any of






. Linear city block preferences or
quadratic Euclidean preferences are only speciﬁc cases of this general result. The preferences
over the original set of policy bundles must be multi-attribute single peaked and modular.
Multi-attribute single peakedness is an extension of the standard notion of single peakedness,
so that preferences are single peaked on any given dimension. Modularity is a separability
condition consistent with the arguments of the psychology literature I mentioned above, such
as Shepard [23] and Arabie [1]. Preferences are modular if an agent evaluates attributes or
policies independently of each other, so that her preference over one policy is invariant with
changes in other policies.
To my knowledge, the directly related literature is scant. Kannai [9] and Richter and
4Wong [22] ﬁnd conditions such that preferences in a given space can be represented by a
concave utility function, but they do not consider a mapping into a new space in which the
utility function could be concave. The closest reference is by Bogomolnaia and Laslier [6],
who seek to ﬁnd how many dimensions must be used to represent any ordinal preference
proﬁle over a ﬁnite number of alternatives using Euclidean preferences. They do not require
that the spatial representation of alternatives respect a natural order within each attribute,
a n dt h e ya r ei n t e r e s t e do n l yi naﬁnite number of alternatives, disregarding, for instance,
lotteries. Hence, for a single individual, their problem is trivial. Any preference can be
represented in just one dimension by assigning alternatives to natural numbers according to
the preference order of the agent. By contrast, I consider an inﬁnite number of alternatives
by studying lotteries over alternatives, and I seek to ﬁnd a spatial representation in K
dimensions that is consistent in each dimension with the natural order of values within
each of exogenously given K attributes. Since the problem I address has more restrictions,
not every preference relation is representable in any space using the city block distance
or Euclidean distances, even if there is a single agent. I ﬁnd axiomatic conditions on the
preference relation under which, in some space, it is representable by a utility function that
depends on any desired lp norm.
F o ras o c i e t yw i t hm u l t i p l ea g e n t sIﬁnd further necessary and suﬃcient conditions to
guarantee that there exists a common space that satisﬁes the restriction on the number of
dimensions and the monotonicity with respect to the natural order of values within each
attribute, and is such that preferences over points in this common space can be represented
by means of utility functions that are linearly decreasing in the city block distance to
the ideal point of each agent. I also ﬁnd a diﬀerent set of conditions such that there
exists a space in which preferences can be represented by a utility function that is linearly
decreasing in the square of the Euclidean distance. As noted above, the result on city
block preferences has very important implications for political competition over multiple
dimensions: If preferences can be represented by the city block distance, for open sets of
distributions of ideal policies there exists a policy bundle in the core of the majority voting
rule so that it is a stable outcome, which contrasts sharply with the generic inexistence of
stable policies in the majority rule core if preferences are smooth.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide theoretical foundations for the assump-
tion of utility functions that are decreasing in the city block distance to an ideal policy in a
5multidimensional policy space, parting from abstract primitives in which alternatives have
multiple attributes and are endowed with a natural order within each attribute.
An Exogenous Spatial Representation
Let X ⊂ RK be a convex set of alternatives with a non empty interior. Let ∆X be the
set of all simple lotteries deﬁned over X. For any given lottery p ∈ ∆X, let p(x) denote
the probability that p assigns to x ∈ X. For any p ∈ ∆X, the support of p is the set
{x : p(x) > 0}. Slightly abusing notation, let x,y,z,w ∈ X denote as well degenerate
lotteries, so they belong to ∆X.L e t xk denote the k − th coordinate of x and let x−k
denote the vector of K − 1 dimensions that contains all the coordinates of x except xk.
Then we can write x as x =( xk,x −k).
Let % be a complete and transitive binary relation on ∆X representing the weak pref-
erences of agent i over lotteries on X. Let x Â y denote (x % y, not y % x) and let x ∼ y
denote (x % y, y % x). Let % satisfy the independence and archimedean axioms due to Von
Neumann and Morgenstern [25].
Axiom 1 (Archimedean): If p,q,r ∈ ∆X such that p Â q Â r, then there is an α ∈ (0,1)
such that αp +( 1− α)r ∼ q.
Axiom 2 (Independence): For all p,q,r ∈ ∆X and any α ∈ (0,1),t h e np % q if and only
if αp +( 1− α)r % αq +( 1− α)r.
Then the preferences over lotteries can be represented by a utility function u : X −→ R




X q(x)u(x). This is part
of the celebrated expected utility theorem by Von Neumann and Morgenstern.
Assume that % has a unique maximal element x∗ ∈ X such that x∗ Â p for any p ∈ ∆X,
p 6= x∗. The degenerate lottery x∗ is the most preferred alternative of the agent. For
convenience, relocate the origin of coordinates so that x∗ =( 0 ,...,0). The set X is divided
into 2K orthants. Each orthant is one of the subsets composed of the points that do not
contain both points that are strictly positive and points that are strictly negative in any
given dimension; the analog of a quadrant on R2 or an octant on R3. Let Oj denote an
arbitrary one of them, for j ∈ {1,2,3,...,2K}






p(x)x ∈ X is
the expectation value of lottery p. A risk neutral agent is indiﬀerent between a lottery, or the
expected value of the lottery. This is the standard condition in economics, with non satiated
agents who always want more good to consume. However, with ideological preferences, that
are satiated at x∗, this condition is violated by all agents: For any p ∈ ∆X such that
X
x∈X
p(x)x = x∗ and p(x∗) < 1, the agent prefers her ideal point for sure over the lottery.
This preference is not really indicative of an attitude towards risk, but rather, of a preference
for attaining the best outcome for certain, over variance over outcomes that are either too
much or too little with respect to the optimum.
A weaker risk neutrality condition is appropriate. I call it orthant risk aversion. The in-
tuition simply tries to pin back the notion of risk in an environment with satiated preferences
to the standard deﬁnition of risk with monotonic preferences. Consider the orthant that is
non positive in all dimensions. Within that orthant, the agent wants more of everything.
This is the standard economic environment. Hence the standard risk neutrality concept ap-
plies, within this orthant. A risk neutral agent is indiﬀerent between a lottery that assigns
positive probability to outcomes in this orthant and its expected value. I impose the same
condition within any other orthant: A risk neutral agent is indiﬀerent between any lottery
that assigns positive probability to outcomes in only one orthant and the expected value of
this lottery.
Axiom 3 (Orthant risk neutrality) p ∼
X
x∈X
p(x)x for any p whose support is contained in
a single orthant.
Similarly, % is orthant risk averse if
X
x∈X
p(x)x Â p for any p whose support is contained
in a single orthant and contains x,y such that x Â y. That is, the preferences of the agent
are orthant risk averse if given any lottery that introduces uncertainty about the desirability
of the outcome, but the outcome is sure to be within an orthant, the agent strictly prefers
the expected value of the lottery for sure over the lottery.
I show that if preferences over lotteries satisfy orthant risk neutrality, along with com-
pleteness, transitivity, independence and the archimedean axiom, then the preferences over
sure outcomes can be represented by a utility function that is linear in the distance mea-
sured by a generalization of the l1 or city bloc norm. To state the result formally, I ﬁrst
need to deﬁne the generalized weighted city block norm.
7Deﬁnition 1 For any λ ∈ R2K








λk+ > 0 if xk > 0




, k ∈ {1,...,K}.
Let (X,k·kλ) b et h em e t r i cs p a c ew i t hs e to fe l e m e n t sX and distance d(x,y)=kx − ykλ .
The standard l1 norm, which I denote k·k1 has equal weights in every dimension, and
on each side of the origin, that is, λk+ = λk− = λj+ = λj− for any j,k ∈ {1,...,K}.
A standard weighted city block norm has diﬀerent weights for each dimension, but equal
weights along each dimension, λk+ = λk− for any k ∈ {1,...,K}. It corresponds to the
intuition of computing time of driving in Manhattan, were driving north-south along an
avenue is faster than driving east-west along a street. The generalized weighted city bloc
norm allows for weights to be diﬀerent to each side of the origin along the same dimension.
For an intuition, this captures the time of driving where not only north-south avenues are
faster, but the east and west sides of the city have diﬀerent qualities of pavement on the
s t r e e t s ,s ot h a ti ti se a s i e rt ot r a n s i ti ns o m eq u arters than others, even while moving in the
same direction.
Now I state the ﬁrst result of this paper.
Theorem 1 Let % be orthant risk neutral, have a unique maximal element x∗ and be rep-
resentable by the expected utility of a function u : X −→ R.T h e n∃λ ∈ R2K
+ such that u is
linearly decreasing in distance to x∗ in the space (X,k·kλ).
Proof. Recall x∗ = {0}K and Oj denotes an arbitrary orthant j, for any j ∈ {1,...,2K}.
Let int(X) be the interior of X,l e tN(x,ε) be the neighborhood of radius ε around x,
and let O1 be the non negative orthant. Let Y ⊆ RK be the smallest Cartesian product
Y = Y1 × Y2... × YK such that Yk ⊆ R for each k ∈ {1,...,K} and X ⊆ Y. For notational
simplicity, let u(x∗)=0 .
Since int(X) 6= ∅, ∃j ∈ {1,...,2K} such that ∃x ∈ int(X)∩Oj with xk 6=0for every k ∈
{1,...,K}. Without loss of generality, assume j =1and choose a point x ∈ int(X)∩O1,s u c h
that xk > 0 for every k ∈ {1,...,K}. For each dimension k ∈ {1,...,K} and a suﬃciently
small ε such that N(x,ε) ∈ O1, choose an xk ∈ N(x,ε) such that xk = αkx +( 1− αk)yk
for some αk ∈ [0,1) and some yk such that yk
k > 0 and yk
i =0for all i 6= k, i ∈ {1,...,K}.
That is, each xk is a convex combination of x and a point in the non negative orthant
that diﬀers from x∗ only on coordinate k. I construct an extended preference relation %S
8that is orthant risk neutral in Y and is such that for any x,y ∈ X, x %S y ⇐⇒ x % y.
I also extend the domain of u from X to Y. In order to satisfy orthant risk neutrality in
Y, u(xk)=αku(x)+( 1− αk)u(yk), or u(yk)=
u(xk)−αu(x)
(1−α) . By orthant risk neutrality, for
any δ ≥ 0,u (δyk)=δu(yk). Let (yk,0) denote an arbitrary point y that assigns value yk to
coordinate k and value 0 to any other coordinate. For any γ<0, and any k ∈ {1,...,K}, let
yk,γ denote the point (y
k,γ
k ,0) ∈ Y such that u(yk,γ)=γ, if such point exists. Arbitrarily
ﬁx λ1+ =1 . For any k ∈ {2,...,K}, and γ<0 close enough to zero such that y
k,γ
k exists for







. For this γ, let Z = {x ∈ O1 ∩X : x =
K P
k=1




pk =1 }. That is, Z is the set of points in the non negative orthant and in X that
can be constructed as a linear combination of points in the axis of Y that generate utility
γ. By orthant risk neutrality, u(z)=γ for any z ∈ Z.
Any x ∈ O1 ∩ X can be expressed as a linear transformation αz for some α ≥ 0 and
some z ∈ Z, or, rather, there exists a function z(x):O1∩X −→ Z, in particular, z(x)= x
α.


























The ﬁrst equality holds because x is a transformation of z. The second holds because z is
a linear combination of {y1,γ,...,yK,γ}. The third equality simply expands the formula of
λk+ and the last is algebra. Distance ||·||λ is linearly increasing in α and utility is linearly
decreasing in α. So utility is linearly decreasing in distance ||·||λ, within the non negative
orthant.
The non negative orthant was arbitrarily chosen; the same result holds in any other
orthant. Speciﬁcally, for each dimension k, repeating the above procedure on orthant j,w e
ﬁnd weights λ
j
k that correspond to the weight on dimension k found in the proof constructed
for orthant j. Consider any two orthants O1 and O2 that diﬀer on the sign on dimension k
but coincide on the sign on all other dimensions, and the sign in at least one dimension is
positive. Take x ∈ O1 ∩ O2 such that xi > 0 and xj =0for all j 6= i. That is, take a point
that is positive in only one dimension and belongs to both O1 and O2. Since x belongs to
the same indiﬀerent curve when measured as a point in orthant O1 or orthant O2,i fλ1
i and
λ2
i respectively denote the weight of dimension i in the norm used in orthants O1 and O2, it
must be λ1
i = λ2
i. Orthants O1 and O2 were arbitrarily chosen among the class of orthants
9that are positive on dimension i and diﬀe ro nt h es i g no n l yo nd i m e n s i o nk. So for any two
orthants that are positive on dimension i and diﬀer on only one dimension, the weight on
dimension i is the same. By induction, it follows that the weight on dimension i is the same
for all orthants that are positive on dimension i. But i positive was arbitrary, so it follows
that for any i ∈ {1,...,K}, the weight on dimension i in the metric used on all orthants
that are positive in dimension i is a common parameter λi+, and, similarly, the weight on
dimension i is λi− for all orthants that are negative on dimension i.
The presence of a maximal element captures the satiated preferences typical in a space
of ideological issues. The theorem then says that if the agent is risk neutral in each orthant,
then only a generalization of the city block distance represents preferences.
A common assumption in spatial models is that preferences are symmetric on each
dimension, taking the maximal element as the origin of coordinates.
Axiom 4 (Spatial symmetry) For any x ∈ X and any k ∈ {1,2,...,K}, if (−xk,x −k) ∈ X
then (xk,x −k) ∼ (−xk,x −k).
I call this property spatial symmetry to distinguish it from the unrelated deﬁnition of
symmetry of binary relations.
Corollary 1 Let % be orthant risk neutral, spatially symmetric, contain a degenerate max-
imal element x∗ a n db er e p r e s e n t a b l eb yt h ee x p e c t e du t i l i t yo faf u n c t i o nu : X −→ R.
Then ∃(λ1,λ 2,...,λ K) ∈ RK
+ such that u is linearly decreasing in distance to x∗ in the
space (X,k·kλ),w h e r ek·kλ is a weighted city block metric so that λk+ = λk− for all
k ∈ {1,2,...,K}.
If preferences are spatially symmetric, along each dimension utility loses are equal in
each direction away from the origin, so the generalized weighted city block metric reduces
to a standard weighted city block metric where the weights correspond to the importance
of each dimension, without distinctions between each of the two half-spaces along each
dimension.
Utility functions that depend on the Euclidean distance do not represent risk neutral
agents. It is well known that concave utility functions represent risk averse individuals.
It is perhaps less obvious that utility functions that are linear on Euclidean distance are
neither orthant risk neutral, nor orthant risk averse. Linear Euclidean preferences are not
10separable once we consider lotteries over alternatives and the risk attitude of the agent varies
depending on the lottery under consideration. An agent with linear Euclidean preferences
is risk neutral about lotteries that involve outcomes that all lay in a ray away from the ideal
point, but she is risk averse about any other lotteries. For instance, an agent with ideal
policy (0,0) and linear Euclidean preferences is indiﬀerent between (1,0) for sure or an even
lottery between (0,0) and (2,0). However, if we change the value of the second dimension,
and make the same comparison, the agent prefers (1,y) to an even lottery between (0,y)
and (2,y) for any y 6=0 .
A practical implication is that the preferences of agents that are risk neutral, or risk
averse, should not be represented by a utility function that is linear on Euclidean distance,
choosing instead a utility representation that is concave in some distance if the agents are
risk averse, or linear on the city block metric if the agents are risk neutral. Risk aversion
is a more frequent assumption, but, as noted by Osborne [18], risk aversion over economic
d e c i s i o n sd o e sn o ti m p l yr i s ka v e r s i o no v e ri deological issues and “in the absence of any
convincing empirical evidence, it is not clear which of the assumptions [concavity, linearity,
or convexity] is more appropriate.” However, recent empirical work by Berinsky and Lewis
[4] ﬁnds an application where US voters are risk neutral.
In summary, recent empirical work has found applications in which agents are risk
neutral on their preferences deﬁned over the spatial representation of the policy space used
in these applications. If these ﬁndings are robust, theoretical models of political competition
in these applications should assume that utility is linear in the city block distance.
An Endogenous Spatial Representation
Theorem 1 shows that if agents have risk neutral preferences over points in a multidimen-
sional space that are representable by a utility function, then this utility function is linear
in distance to the ideal point, where distance is measured according to a generalization of
the l1 norm. It is important to note that the multidimensional space is itself an abstract
representation of the set of policy alternatives. The units of measurement of the ideological
dimensions and the mapping from speciﬁc policies to their location on the spatial repre-
sentation may be objects of design. In some applications, the spatial representation of
alternatives may be exogenously given by the available data, as it is, for instance, in the
11empirical work on US voters by Berinsky and Lewis [4], where voters identify the point
where they subjectively locate the candidates. In other applications, there may not be a
clear way to represent alternatives on a Euclidean space, and the theorist may choose among
competing mappings of the set of alternatives into the Euclidean space. In this environment,
risk neutrality is an assumption on risk attitudes given the chosen spatial representation,
or alternatively, we can interpret the assumption of risk neutrality as a joint assumption on
the mapping of the set of alternatives to the space and the risk attitude of the agent. A
now consider a more abstract model that take as primitive an ordinal preference relation
over a set of policies with multiple attributes, without any spatial representation.
Let the set of attributes, denoted A, be of size K. For each attribute k ∈ A = {1,...,K},
let Xk be the set of possible values on attribute k. This set can be ﬁnite, countable or
uncountable. Let the elements of Xk be ordered by a linear order ≥k and let this order
have a unique maximal and minimal element. Given the possible policies on each issue, let
the set of alternatives be the Cartesian product X = X1 × X2 × ... × XK and let ∆X be
the set of simple lotteries on X. In a political economy application, each attribute k ∈ A is
a policy issue and X is the set of alternative policy bundles.
The primitive on preferences is a complete and transitive binary relation % on ∆X
that satisﬁes the archimedean and independence axiom, so that % is representable by the
expected utility of a utility function deﬁned over X.
A spatial representation of X is a vector valued function f =( f1,f 2,...,f K) such that
fk : Xk −→ R is strictly increasing in ≥k for each k ∈ A and f(x) ∈ RK represents
alternative x ∈ X. The motivating question is under what conditions on % there exists
a spatial representation f such that the preferences over f(X) ⊆ RK are risk neutral.
Under these conditions, the preferences % over the abstract set X can be represented by a
utility function that is linearly decreasing in a generalized l1 distance to an ideal point in
a Euclidean space. Let L(x,y) be a lottery that assigns equal probability to x and y. Let
x ∨ y =( m a x {x1,y 1},...,max{xK,y K} and x ∨ y =( m i n {x1,y 1},...,min{xK,y K} be the
join and the meet of x and y
Axiom 5 (Modularity) For all x,y ∈ X, L(x,y) ∼ L(x ∨ y,x∧ y).
Modular preferences are such that the agent evaluates changes in one attribute in the
same manner, regardless of the values in other attributes. For added intuition, consider
12an example with two issues and let x,y lie in the non positive quadrant with respect to
the ideal policy, so that among all four options in the lotteries, x ∨ y is the best outcome
in both issues, x ∧ y is the worst outcome in both issues, and x and y are each good in
one issue and bad in the other. If the outcome is determined by two lotteries, one on each
issue, and these lotteries assign equal probability to the good and bad outcome on their
respective issue, an agent with modular preferences is indiﬀerent about the correlation of
the two lotteries. Birkhoﬀ [5] calls a function f satisfying f(x)+f(y)=f(x∨y)+f(x∧y)
a valuation. See Kreps [10], Milgrom and Shannon [16] and Topkis [24] for related ordinal
and cardinal deﬁnitions of modularity.




















A multi-attribute single peaked preference relation has a best policy such that, mov-
ing away from the peak on any given attribute, preferences decrease, as in a unidimen-
sional single peaked relation. This condition of single-peakedness is weaker than the multi-
dimensional single peakedness used by Barberà, Gul and Stacchetti [2], but together with
modularity, it suﬃces to guarantee that their stricter restriction is also satisﬁed, and that
alternatives and preferences can be represented in a vector space such that the utility of










Theorem 2 Suppose % is representable by the expected utility of u : X −→ R. For any







k : Xk −→ R is strictly increasing in ≥k for each k ∈ {1,...,K}, and
ii) u(x)=−(kfp(x)kp)p,
exists if and only if % is multi-attribute single peaked and modular.
Proof. (only if). Suppose preference % is not multi-attribute single peaked. Then, there





















































u(x2) < min{u(x1),u(x∗)}. Hence u(x) is not decreasing in ||f(x)||1 . Suppose (absurd)



























¯ ¯p and gk(xk) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ f
p
k(xk) ≥




−kg(x)k1 . But u(x) is not decreasing in ||f(x)||1 for any f, hence this is a contradiction.
Suppose % is not modular. Then ∃x,y ∈ X s.t. L(x,y) ¿ L(x∨y,x∧y), which implies
u(x)+u(y) 6= u(x∨y)+u(x∧y). However, ||f(x)||1+||f(y)||1 = ||f(x ∨ y)||1+||f(x ∧ y)||1 .
So u(x) is not linearly decreasing in ||f(x)||1 . The same transformation as in the previous
paragraph extends this proof to any p.
(if). Suppose % is modular and multi-attribute single peaked. Let (x∗
k,x ∗
−k) denote x∗.
For each k ∈ {1,2,...,K}, construct f1
k : Xk −→ R as follows: f1
k(x∗














−k); and for any x
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−k). By multi-attribute single peakedness, these
functions f1
k are strictly increasing in ≥k . By construction, u(x) is linearly decreasing in
distance to f1(x∗) in the space (f1(X), ||·||1) for any x such that xk = x∗
k for any k ∈ AK−1,
where Ak−1 ⊂ A and |Ak−1| = K − 1.
Suppose (proof by induction) that u(x) is linearly decreasing in distance to f1(x∗) in
the space (f1(X), ||·||1) for any x such that xk = x∗
k for any k ∈ Am, where Am ⊂ A. Iw a n t
to show that u(z) is also linearly decreasing in distance for any z ∈ X be such that zk = z∗
k
for any k ∈ Am−1, where Am−1 ⊂ Am and |Am−1| = |Am| − 1. Let i be a dimension such
that zi = xi 6= x∗
i. Let j be the dimension such that zj 6= xj = x∗
j. Let w ∈ X be such that
wi = x∗
i;wj = x∗
j and wk = zk for k/ ∈ {i,j}. Let y ∈ X be such that yi = x∗
i and yk = zk
for k 6= i. Then {w,y,x,z} is a lattice, where w % x,y % z. By the inductive hypothesis,














where the second equality follows from wk = x∗
k for k ∈ {i,j}. Since, again by the inductive




i)| and u(y)=u(w) − |f1




u(z)=u(y)+u(x) − u(w)=u(w) − |f1
i (xi) − f1
i (x∗
i)| − |f1
j (yj) − f1
j (x∗
j)|
= u(w) − |f1
i (zi) − f1
i (x∗
i)| − |f1























Since the inductive hypothesis is true, as shown, for |Am| ≥ K − 1,i ti st r u eb yt h e
inductive argument for any size of Am, and therefore, for any z ∈ X, u(z) is linearly










¯ ¯1/p and f
p
k(xk) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ f1




















In particular, and most relevant in applications, theorem 2 says that if preferences are
modular and multi-attribute single peaked, we can represent alternatives and preferences
in a speciﬁc vector space using a utility function that is linear in the l1 norm, or we can
represent them in a diﬀerent space using a utility function that is quadratic in the l2 norm.
What we cannot do is represent them in any space using a utility function that is linear
in the l2 norm, or a utility function that exponential in the l2 norm, such as the one used
in the celebrated D-NOMINATE method to estimate the location of the ideal policy in
two dimensions of US legislators devised by Poole and Rosenthal [20]. Euclidean utility
functions that are not quadratic in the Euclidean distance are inconsistent with preferences
satisfying the modularity assumption. Modularity is a separability assumption that requires
agents to treat issues independently, assessing their preferences over policies on one issue (or
over lotteries over policies on one issue) in the same manner regardless of the policies in any
other issue. Whether preferences are separable across issues is an empirical question. Lacy
[11] searches for evidence of non separability across pairs of issues that seem to be related,
such as taxes and spending, pollution regulation and cleaning up of the environment, or the
15status of English as an oﬃcial language and immigration laws. He ﬁnds mixed evidence:
Many respondents to surveys report non separable preferences in some pairs of related
issues, such as income tax and anti-crime spending, but almost no respondents report non
separable preferences in other pairs of close issues, such as English and immigration laws.
While outside his study, I conjecture that most agents have separable preferences across
issues that do not seem to be related, such as the status of English as an oﬃcial language
and environmental protection.
Many issues, such as abortion, gay rights, civil rights or environmental policy among
others, do not have a natural mapping from policy alternatives to the real line, so the set
of alternative policy bundles is not endowed with a spatial representation as a primitive
and any spatial representation is only one of many possible representations. Theorem 1
showed that using the city block metric to represent preferences implies assuming that
the agent is risk neutral in a given spatial representation. To the extent that the spatial
representation is an object of choice for theorists and not a primitive object, any assumption
over preferences on the space is diﬃcult to interpret. It is preferable to make assumptions
on the primitives of the choice problem: on the original set of alternatives, which is not
exogenously endowed with any spatial representation, and the preferences over this set.
Theorem 2 makes explicit the restriction on primitives implied by the use of the city block
or quadratic Euclidean utilities. Interestingly, the implicit restriction is the same for these
two commonly used utility functions: Preferences over the primitive set of alternatives must
satisfy separability in the sense of modularity, and single peakedness.
To my knowledge, there is no parallel characterization of the set of preference proﬁles
over the primitive set of alternatives that are consistent with a utility function that is
linear or exponential in the Euclidean distance. Bogomolnaia and Laslier [6] show that any
preference relation can be represented by Euclidean preferences in a space with a suﬃciently
large number of dimensions, but the assumption of linear Euclidean preferences in a given
space with a ﬁxed, small number of dimensions, while ubiquitous in the literature, implies
unknown and possibly unwarranted restrictions on the admissible preferences deﬁned over
the primitive set of alternatives.
It may seem surprising that the same preference relation can be represented using a
city block utility function, or using a quadratic Euclidean utility function, particularly in
light of the result by Plott [19] on generic inexistence of majority voting core outcomes if
16preferences are Euclidean (or more generally, if they preferences are smooth), and the more
positive results on the existence of core outcomes under majority voting with city block
preferences by Rae and Taylor [21], Wendell and Thorson [26], McKelvey and Wendell [15]
and Humphreys and Laver [8]. The explanation of these divergent results on existence
of core outcomes depending on whether utility functions are smooth or city block, when
it is possible to map a spatial representation in which an agent has quadratic Euclidean
preferences into another space in which the agent has city block preferences is that the results
on existence of core outcomes rely on a common space for all agents in a society with at least
three agents. It does not suﬃce for each agent to have her own spatial representation of the
set of alternatives such that according to this subjective representation, her preferences are
city block. The need for a common spatial representation imposes further restrictions that
I detail in the next section.
A Common Spatial Representation for Multiple Agents
In the previous section, the primitive on preferences is a complete and transitive binary
relation % on ∆X that satisﬁes the archimedean and independence axiom, so that % is
representable by the expected utility of a utility function deﬁned over X.
In a society N with n agents, the new primitive are n such binary relations deﬁned on
∆X that satisfy the archimedean and independence axiom, so that %i is representable by
the expected utility of a utility function ui deﬁned over X for any i ∈ N = {1,...,n}. For
any p ∈ ∆X, l e ts u p p o r to fp be supp(p)={x ∈ X : p(x) > 0}. This is the subset of
alternatives to which lottery p assigns positive probability.
In this section I extend theorem 2 to a society with multiple agents for the cases of
the l1 norm in theorem 3, and for the l2 norm in theorem 4. The additional necessary and
suﬃcient conditions to ﬁnd a common spatial representation for all agents such that all their
utility functions are linear in the city block distance to their respective ideal points, while
heavy on notation, have a simple interpretation that I detail after the formal statement of
theorem 3. The conditions for representability by means of an l2 norm in a common space
are more complex.
Let (f(X),kf(x)k1) be the metric space given by the spatial representation f : X −→
RK and the metric based on the l1 norm, so that the distance between two points f(x),
17f(y) ∈ RK is kf(x) − f(y)k1 . Let F be the set of spatial representations f =( f1,...,f K)
such that fk : Xk −→ R is strictly increasing in ≥k for each k ∈ A. For each attribute k, let
xmax
k and xmin
k be such that xmin
k ≤k xk ≤k xmax
k for any xk ∈ Xk. Given any two agents i,j
with preferred alternatives xi and xj, for each k, relabel the agents according to a function
σk : {i,j} −→ {h,l} such h is the agent with higher ideal value in attribute k, labeled xh
k
and l is the agent with a lower ideal value xl
k in attribute k. With this notation, I state the
result.
Theorem 3 Assume %i is multi-attribute single peaked and modular for every i ∈ N. A
spatial representation f ∈ F such that
ui(x)=−
° °f(x) − f(xi)
° °
1 for every i ∈ N
exists if and only if, for any i,j ∈ N, the following conditions hold.
1. For any k ∈ A, ∀x1
k,x 2
k,x 3






∀α ∈ [0,1], given p1,p 2,p 3 ∈ ∆X such that p1(xmin
k ,x l
−k)=α, p1(xl)=1 − α,
p2(xh
k,x l







−k) ⇐⇒ pz ∼l (xz
k,x l
−k) for any z ∈ {1,2,3}.
2. For any k ∈ A such that xi
k ≤k x
j
k and any x1
k such that x1
k ≤k xi




k and any x1
k ≥k xi
k, ∃α ∈ (0,1] and ∃δ>0 such that:









































Proof. (only if). Suppose (absurd) that ui(x)=−
° °f(x) − f(xi)
° °
1 for every i ∈ N,
but condition 1 fails for z =1 . Then, ∃x1















which, since ul(x) is linearly decreasing in
° ° °f(x) − f(xl)
° ° °
1





















k ) − fk(xh







k )+( 1− α)fk(xh






k )) 6= fk(xl
k) − fk(x1
k),
a contradiction. The cases for z =2and z =3follow an analogous argument.
Suppose (absurd) that condition 2 does not hold. Without loss of generality assume
that there exists k,x1







−k)) + (1 − δα)ui(xi)=δui((x
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k,x i
















































(if). By theorem 2, %i can be represented by a utility function that is linearly decreasing











ui is rescalable, let fk(xmax
k ) − fk(x
j




k ], ﬁnd α3 such that p3 ∼i
(x3
k,x i
−k) for p3 ∈ ∆X such that p3(x
j
k,x i






k)=α3. By condition 1, case z =3 , p3 ∼j (x3
k,x i
−k), s o ,i fw ei n d e p e n d e n t l yc o n s t r u c t
the spatial representation fj under which %j is representable by uj linearly decreasing in
the l1 distance to xj, and we ﬁx f
j
k(xmax














k). A symmetric argument applies to any x1
k ≤k xi





k). With just condition 1, we can ﬁnd a common spatial representation
such that, in each dimension, the utility of agents i and j is piecewise linearly decreasing in
the distance to their respective ideal points, with three diﬀerent pieces corresponding to the
set of points with a higher value in the given dimension than both ideal points, lower than
both ideal points, and in between both ideal points. Condition 2 is necessary to guarantee
that utility is linear in distance across all three intervals. Take any x1
k such that x1
k ≤k xi
k
. Choose α and δ such that
αδui((x1
k,x i
−k)) + (1 − αδ)ui(xi)=δui((x
j
k,x i

































where fj is the spatial representation such that uj is linearly decreasing in the l1 distance to
xj. Notice that f
j














k)|. Then, both spatial representations coincide for any xk ≤k x
j
k.




k shows that f
j
k also
coincides with fk for any xk ≥k xi
k completes the proof for n =2 . But j was arbitrary, so
every j ∈ N shares the common spatial representation f and has a utility representation
that is linearly decreasing in the l1 distance to the ideal point of the agent in the space
f(X).
Condition 1 has a very simple interpretation. Fixing the value of all attributes except k,
and evaluating lotteries that assign diﬀerent values to attribute k, if i and j agree in their
ordinal preference among all the possible outcomes of the lotteries, then they agree on their
ranking of the lotteries as well. If i has a lower ideal value on attribute k than j, then i and
j share the same ranking among all lotteries on dimension k that assign positive probability
only to values that are no greater than the ideal value of i. Similarly, for lotteries that are
in any event above both ideal policies, agents agree that they want less of attribute k, and
by condition 1 they agree on their ranking of these lotteries. In the intermediate interval
between their two ideal policies, the agents have opposite rankings over sure outcomes: One
20agent wants less, the other one wants more. Condition 1 states that if agent i is indiﬀerent
between a lottery in this interval and a sure outcome, agent j must be indiﬀerent as well.
An intuition is that in this region the agents are in a zero-sum game: Whatever i gains, j
loses, so if i is indiﬀerent between two lotteries, j must be indiﬀerent as well.


















2, then xi ∼j p.
If agent i ﬁnds that lowering the value of attribute k from her ideal xi
k to x1
k is as bad as
increasing it to x2
k, then j considers that increasing it from x1
k to xi
k is as good as increasing
it from xi
k to x2
k. Or, if agent i subjectively considers her ideal value the midpoint between
x1
k to x2
k, then j agrees and also considers xi
k to be the midpoint between x1
k to x2
k. If X is
not convex, we need the richer notation to express the same intuition: If agent i places her
ideal point at a fraction δ
1+δ of the way from x1
k to x
j
k, then j also subjectively places xi
k at




k. Agents agree on the importance of a change in value in their
interval of agreement, relative to a change in value in their interval of disagreement. That
is, if agent i is willing to shift up to a certain amount of probability from value x1
k in an
interval of agreement to a less preferred value x2
k in order to change the outcome from x3
k to
x4
k in the region of disagreement, then agent j is willing to cede exactly the same amount
of probability to avoid this change from x3
k to x4
k.
Succinctly, and a bit informally, if agents agree on lotteries when they agree on sure
outcomes, if they have exactly opposite preferences over lotteries when they have exactly
opposite preferences over sure outcomes, and they concede the same importance to the
region of agreement vis a vis the region of disagreement, then their ordinal preferences over
multiatribute objects can be represented in a common space such that these preferences can
all be represented by utility functions that are linearly decreasing in the city block distance
to the respective ideal points.
Theorem 3 has very important consequences in political competition over policy bundles
with multiple policy dimensions: If agents have city block preferences over a common space,
then under certain conditions that are not non-generic, there exist policy bundles that are
in the majority voting rule core, so they cannot be defeated by any other policy, as shown by
Rae and Taylor [21], Wendell and Thorson [26], McKelvey and Wendell [15] and Humphreys
21and Laver [8].
With regards to representability by the l2 distance, Bogomolnaia and Laslier [6] show
that any proﬁle of preference relations can be represented by Euclidean preferences in a
space with a suﬃciently large number of dimensions. With a ﬁxed number of dimensions,
the goal of representing preferences by means of a Euclidean utility function in a common
space becomes a much more diﬃcult task, and the conditions on preferences become very
restrictive.
Theorem 4 Assume %i is multi-attribute single peaked and modular for every i ∈ N. A
spatial representation f ∈ F such that
ui(x)=−(
° °f(x) − f(xi)
° °
2)2 for every i ∈ N
exists if and only if, for any i,j ∈ N, the following conditions hold.
3. For any k ∈ A and any x1
k,x 2
k,x 3












γ2 and r(xl)=1− δ





























−k) ⇐⇒ αh =2
√
αl − αl;














be such that (xh
k,x l















−k) ⇐⇒ αh =2 γ2 +2 γαl + αl − 2γ(γ2 +2 γαl + γ)1/2.
4. For any k ∈ A such that xi
k ≤k x
j
k and any x1
k such that x1
k ≤k xi




k and any x1
k ≥k xi
k, ∃α ∈ (0,1] and ∃δ>0 such that:
















































Proof. (only if). Suppose that ui(x)=−(kf(x) − f(x∗)k2)2 for every i ∈ N. In the ﬁrst





−k)) + (1 − αl)ul(xl)=ul((x1
k,x l
−k)),
which, since ul(x) is linearly decreasing in (
° °f(x) − f(xl)
° °











Arbitrarily rescale ul(x) so that (fk(xl
k) − fk(xmin








We want to show that q ∼h (x1
k,x l






1+2γ . In utility terms, q ∼h
(x1
k,x l
−k) i fa n do n l yi f
αh(fk(xmin
k ) − fk(xh
























Note that if ul(x)=−(
° °f(x) − f(xl)
° °
2)2, then s ∼l r if and only if d = γ. The expression
of αh as a function of αl in the third case of condition 3 is the same as solving for αl in









αl, so q ∼h (x1
k,x l
−k)
i fa n do n l yi f






23Suppose (absurd) that condition 4 does not hold. Without loss of generality assume
that there exists k,x1







−k)) + (1 − δα)ui(xi)=δui((x
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k,x i























Rescale ul such that fk(x
j
k) − fk(xi
















(if). By theorem 2, %i can be represented by a utility function that is decreasing in
square of the l2 distance to xi in the space given by the spatial representation f. For any
dimension k, assume xi
k ≤k x
j
k (we only need to relabel the agents to do without this
assumption). If xi
k 6= xmin
k , since ui is rescalable, let fk(xi
k) − fk(xmin




k], ﬁnd αi such that p1 ∼i (x1
k,x i
−k) for p1 ∈ ∆X such that p1(xmin
k ,x i
−k)=α1




α1. If we construct the spatial representation





















k)=γ, by taking x1
k = xmin







(1 + d)2 = d2, where
δα = δγ2, so
γ2


















αj +2 γαj = λ2 +2 γλ.
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which, since αh =2
√























k)=fk(xk) for any x2











k) such that uj is quadratic in the Euclidean distance in fi(X), the
construction of fi









k = fk. Since i and j were arbitrary,
t h es a m er e p r e s e n t a t i o nf serves as a common space for all n agents.
While these conditions for representability using a quadratic Euclidean utility function
lack a transparent interpretation, it is useful to compare them to the simpler conditions 1
and 2 in theorem 3. Condition 1 in theorem 3 can be rewritten in terms that follow the
structure of condition 3, and then, condition 1 holds if qz ∼h (xz
k,x l
−k) ⇐⇒ αh = αl for
z ∈ {1,2,3}. Under condition 1, agents i and j evaluate the sure outcome (xz
k,x l
−k) in the
same way in terms of weights to the best and worst alternative in each of the three intervals
under consideration, so they are both indiﬀerent between p,q and (x1
k,x l
−k) i fa n do n l yi f
25p = q, or equivalently, αh = αl. In order for preferences to satisfy condition 3, agents must
instead diﬀer in their preferences over lotteries even in the interval where they agree on
their ordinal preferences over sure outcomes. The diﬀerences between conditions 1 and 3
can be related to notions of risk attitude in the population. Condition 1 can be interpreted
as risk neutrality by all agents, while condition 3 can be interpreted as a speciﬁcc o m m o n
degree of risk aversion by all agents.
For the purpose of a clearer intuition, let X be convex and either restrict the number of
dimensions to one, or assume that xi
−k = x
j
−k so that the ideal value of i and j is distinct
only on attribute k, where xi
k ≤k x
j
k. Since X is convex and preferences are continuous, we
can ﬁnd a point between the ideal policy of i and j such that both agents are indiﬀerent
between this point and a lottery that grants them their ideal point with probability α





k) such that if p(xi)=α, p(xj)=1− α, q(xj)=α and q(xi)=1− α,
then (x2
k,x i
−k) ∼i p and (x2
k,x i
−k) ∼j q. A representation that locates x2




k generates the same risk attitude for agents i and j. Condition 1 for
a representation by means of an l1 norm requires that α =0 .5, which I interpret as risk
neutrality, while condition 3 for a representation by means of an l2 norm requires α =0 .25,
which I interpret as risk aversion.
For lotteries over values below xi
k or values above x
j
k, condition 1 requires agents i and j
to agree on their preferences over such lotteries. Condition 3 is more cumbersome. Consider
the ﬁrst case, x1
k ≤k xi
k and set f(xi
k) − f(xmin




k)=γ in the spatial representation f such that %i can be represented by ui
quadratic Euclidean in f(X). From the perspective of agent i, xj is at a distance γ of xi
in the space where i has quadratic Euclidean preferences and the distance from xmin
k to xi
k
is chosen as the unit of measure. In order for %j to also be representable by a quadratic
Euclidean u2 in the same space, it must be that the preferences over lotteries of agent j
depend on the distance γ. If we take a sequence of preference relations of agent i such that
γ −→ 0, the preferences over lotteries of i and j must converge, so αh −→ αl. If instead
we consider a diﬀerent sequence so that γ increases toward inﬁnity, the preferences over
lotteries of i and j diﬀer in such way that αj −→
√
αi. As %i changes so that γ increases
toward inﬁnity, j must become closer to risk neutral on lotteries over values below xi
k in
order for her preferences to be quadratic Euclidean in the spatial representation dictated by
26the preferences of agent i. While this condition may appear unduly restrictive, it is implicit
in the formulation of any spatial model that uses the standard assumption of quadratic
Euclidean preferences.
Whether preferences over multi-attribute alternatives are such that α =0 .5,a n dαj = αi
in the lotteries discussed in the previous two paragraphs, or whether α<0.5 or in fact













1+2γ would support the assumption of quadratic Euclidean preferences.
On the other hand, evidence that α ≈ 0.5,a n dαj ≈ αi would suggest that, albeit standard,
the assumption of quadratic Euclidean preferences is unwarranted and it is appropriate
to assume instead linear city block preferences, with positive implications for existence of
majority core outcomes in multidimensional policy competition.
Discussion
It is a standard in spatial models of political competition to assume that utilities are de-
creasing —linearly, exponentially or in quadratic form- in the Euclidean distance from an
ideal point in the space of policies.
The ﬁrst theoretical contribution of this paper is to prove that given a spatial represen-
tation of the set of alternatives, under standard assumptions, risk neutrality on this space
implies necessarily a utility representation that is linear in a generalized city block distance,
not the Euclidean distance.
In many applications, the primitive set of alternatives is not a subset of a vector space,
and any spatial representation is subjective, arbitrary, or made for convenience. Any as-
sumption on preferences over alternatives in a vector space is not an assumption on prim-
itives, such as preferences over alternatives; it is a joint assumption on preferences over
alternatives, and on the chosen spatial representation of the preferences. The second the-
oretical contribution of this paper is to ﬁnd simple and intuitive necessary and suﬃcient
conditions on the preference relation over the primitive set of alternatives, such that for any
p ≥ 1, there exists a spatial representation of these alternatives under which preferences can
be represented by a utility function that is decreasing in the p power of the lp distance to
an ideal point in the space. This result includes representations by a utility function that is
linear in the city block distance or a utility function that is quadratic in the Euclidean dis-
27tance as special cases. The conditions amount to separability across attributes, and single
peakedness within each attribute.
The third contribution of this paper extends the second result to a society with multiple
agents for the case of linear city block and quadratic Euclidean preferences, ﬁnding addi-
tional conditions under which there exists a spatial representation common to all agents
such that the preference proﬁle of every agent is representable by a utility function that is
linearly decreasing in the l1 distance or quadratic decreasing in the l2 to the ideal point of
the agent in the common space. These conditions are simpler and more intuitive for the
case of city block preferences.
Recent empirical research by Berinsky and Lewis [4] ﬁnds that agents are risk neutral in
their political preferences given their subjective spatial representation of the policy space in
the US. In applications with a given spatial representation of the space of alternatives where
the results of Berinsky and Lewis [4] are robust and agents are risk neutral, political economy
theories of spatial competition on ideological issues should discard utility representations
that are a function of Euclidean distance, and accept instead as the benchmark a utility
function that is linear in the city block metric.
In any application without a given exogenous spatial representation, it is standard to
represent preferences over alternatives with multiple attributes as a linear, quadratic, or
exponential function of the Euclidean distance to an ideal point. I have shown that if pref-
erences are separable and single peaked, utility functions that are linear or exponential on
the Euclidean distance are untenable. Under these assumptions, individual preferences can
be represented by either a linear city block utility function or a quadratic Euclidean utility
function. While either utility representation requires stringent restrictions on preference
proﬁl e si nas o c i e t yw i t hm u l t i p l ea g e n t s ,Ih a v e shown that the conditions such that the
preferences of every agent can be represented in some space common to all agents by a city
block utility function are simpler and more intuitive than the analogous conditions for a
quadratic Euclidean utility function.
An implication of the results in this paper that some received wisdom that relies on
the Euclidean distance perhaps should be reevaluated. For instance, it is well known that
the conditions for existence of an equilibrium in multidimensional policy competition de-
tailed by Plott [19] and generalized by McKelvey and Schoﬁeld [14] hold non-generically
if agents have Euclidean preferences, but these conditions hold more generally if agents
28have city block preferences; if Plott´s conditions are not satisﬁed and agents have Euclid-
ean preferences, McKelvey [12] shows that majority preferences are intransitive under very
weak assumptions, but McKelvey [13] shows that this so-called “chaos result” holds only
under stronger assumptions for non-Euclidean preferences. At the same time, theoretical
contributions that work with the city block metric, such as results on the existence of core
outcomes by Rae and Taylor [21], Wendell and Thorson [26], McKelvey and Wendell [15]
and Humphreys and Laver [8], or that make assumptions on preferences consistent with
city block preferences, such as the results on the existence of strategy proof outcomes by
Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou [3], become more relevant.
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